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duction of such evidence is unfairly prejudicial should the trial
courts exercise their discretion and exclude it.
The confrontation clause has long been held not to bar the
introduction of reliable hearsay.24 Since the Brown court deter-
mined that under the rules of evidence declaration against penal
interest testimony is sufficiently reliable so as to permit its use by
a defendant, there appears to be no constitutional bar to permitting
its use by the prosecution.
Ralph J. Libsohn
Press held accountable in punitive damages for trespass
The first amendment's prohibition on abridging the freedom of
the pressm is grounded in the belief that a free society needs an
97 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan,
dissented. Id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall believed that "[absent the
opportunity for cross-examination [of the declarant], testimony about [an] incriminating
and implicating statement allegedly made by [an accomplice is] constitutionally inadmissi-
ble .. " Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), as controlling. 400 U.S. at 103. Bruton, however, concerned use
of inadmissible hearsay against the defendant which did not fall within any recognized
hearsay exception. 61 App. Div. 2d at 963, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Silverman, J.P., concurring);
see note 215 supra. It appears, therefore, that Bruton is distinguishable from both Dutton
and Cepeda.
The statutory rule at issue in Dutton contrasts with New York law which holds that
although admissions by a co-conspirator in furtherance of conspiracy are admissible against
all co-conspirators, admissions made after the culmination of the common plan are admissi-
ble only against the declarant. RICHARDSON, supra note 205, § 244, at 214-15. See also Daven-
port, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions:
A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1378 (1972).
22 See note 220 supra. This is the teaching of Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970),
wherein the Court held that indicia of reliability were required for the introduction of incrimi-
nating hearsay testimony. Id. at 88-89. The Court noted that such indicia are present if: (1)
the declarant's personal knowledge of the facts contained in the declaration is "abundantly
established"; (2) there is little possibility that the statement is the product of a faulty
recollection; (3) the circumstances indicate that the declarant has not misrepresented the
involvement of the defendant; and (4) the statement appears spontaneous and against the
penal interest of the declarant. Id. Whether the statement in Dutton was against the declar-
ant's penal interest is questionable. Evans' codefendant made the declaration at issue upon
his return to prison after his arraignment on a murder charge. Id. at 77. He was asked by a
fellow inmate; "'How did you make out in court?'" Id. The declarant responded: "'If it
hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now.' "Id. The
self-incriminating aspect of this statement is unclear, as it appears likely that the declarant
was attempting to shift the blame to Evans. One commentator has questioned the preceden-
tial value of Dutton in light of its plurality opinion. See Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay:
A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HoFsTA L. Rav. 32 (1973).
The first amendment of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress
shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The freedoms of the first amendment are protected from state action through the
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informed public22 Recognizing that the right to publish presup-
poses the ability to collect information,'2  courts have acknowledged
a limited first amendment right of the press to gather news. 22s While
criminal or tortious acts committed in the news-gathering process
are outside the protection of the first amendment, 29 the extent of
fourteenth amendment. E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart,
J., concurring); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
The Supreme Court has noted that the first amendment also protects the rights of individuals
to receive information. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-10 (1974);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301 (1965).
"I See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d
974, 977 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1483 (1978); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather
Information, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 838, 839 (1971); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press
to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1505, 1505 (1974).
mn See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). See also Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974); KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd,
46 U.S.L.W. 4830 (June 26, 1978); Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir.
1969); Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 1935) (dictum), rev'd on other
grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936); Forcade v. Knight, 416 F. Supp. 1025, 1031-34 (D.D.C. 1976);
In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957).
Although the Court has recognized a right of access to information, this right does not
encompass a privilege of "special access to information not available to the public generally."
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (dictum) (citations omitted); cf. Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (federal government can validly restrict travel by citizens to Cuba
notwithstanding desire to learn about conditions therein). Branzburg involved three separate
cases in which reporters were asked to disclose confidential sources and information to grand
juries. The reporters refused to testify on first amendment grounds, contending that if they
were compelled to reveal these confidences, their news-gathering abilities would be severely
hampered. The plaintiffs contended that the result would be a restriction on the free flow of
information to the public since confidential sources would be deterred from furnishing infor-
mation to the press. 408 U.S. at 679-81. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating
that the need to thoroughly pursue a criminal investigation and prosecution outweighed
whatever effect the compulsion of grand jury testimony would have on the journalists'
information-gathering activities. Id. at 690-91. The Court cautiously added, however, that if
a grand jury investigation were conducted in other than good faith, first amendment issues
would be raised. Id. at 707. Two years later, in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), the
Court reaffirmed the position that the right to gather news confers no special privileges on
the press. Pell involved a prison regulation which prohibited media interviews with specific
inmates. Three journalists filed suit claiming that the regulation unconstitutionally inhibited
the news-gathering activities of the press. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated
that the press was not entitled to a "constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates
beyond that afforded the general public." Id. at 834. He concluded that the government had
no duty to make available to the press sources of information not generally available to the
public. Id.
21 See, e.g., Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Galella v. Onassis, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). In Davis, the
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the press' liability for such actions has remained unclear.23 Re-
cently, in Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS,23' the Appellate Division, First
Department, held that compensatory and punitive damages are pro-
perly assessable for a trespass committed in the course of news
gathering. 232
In Le Mistral, the defendant directed a reporter and camera
crew to visit various restaurants that had been cited for health code
violations. Following instructions that they were to catch the occu-
pants by surprise,23 the CBS employees entered the plaintiffs res-
taurant unannounced with cameras "rolling" and bright lights shin-
ing.234 Although asked to leave by the owner of the restaurant, the
crew remained on the premises long enough to cause a disruption
defendant, an investigative reporter, made defamatory statements about the plaintiff to the
plaintiff's business associates with the hope of evoking a newsworthy response. 510 F.2d at
733. In his appeal from an award granting the plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages,
the defendant claimed that his statements were protected by the first amendment since they
were made in private, prior to the publication of a story. Id. at 734. The court rejected this
argument, stating that reporters may not utter statements in private that would, if published,
lead to liability. Id.
In Galella, the plaintiff was a freelance photographer who persisted in his attempts to
photograph Jacqueline Onassis and her children. His conduct went beyond ordinary news
coverage and often placed the safety of Mrs. Onassis and her children in jeopardy. 487 F.2d
at 992. In granting the injunctive relief requested by the Onassis family, the court found
Galella guilty of harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery,
commercial exploitation of defendant's personality and invasion of privacy. Id. at 994. The
Second Circuit considered Galella's contention that the first amendment protected his con-
duct while gathering items of general public interest and responded that "[crimes and torts
committed in news gathering are not protected [by the first amendment]. . . .There is no
threat to a free press in requiring its agents to act within the law." Id. at 995-96 (citations
omitted).
In Dietemann, two reporters attempted to expose the plaintiff as a medical charlatan.
449 F.2d at 246. Posing as patients in need of medical care, they surreptitiously photographed
the plaintiff's method of medical treatment and transmitted their conversation with him to
a reporter and state law enforcement officials situated outside the doctor's home. Id. In
plaintiff's suit against Time for invasion of his right to privacy, the Ninth Circuit rejected
defendant's contention that the actions of their reporters were protected by the first amend-
ment. The court stated that "_w]e agree that newsgathering is an integral part of news
dissemination. . . . [However,] the First Amendment has never been construed to accord
newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committted during the course of newsgathering. The
First Amendment is not a license to trespass. ... Id. at 249.
"I The dimensions of the public's right of access to information is, to a great extent,
undefined. Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L.
RAy. 1505, 1507 & n.16 (1974). Since the Supreme Court has interpreted the right of the press
to gather information to be equivalent to that of the public generally, the extent of the press'
rights also remain unclear. See id.
21 61 App. Div. 2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1st Dep't 1978).
212 Id. at 494-95, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18.
2 Id. at 493 n.1, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 816 n.1.
2 Id. at 493, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
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in the restaurant's routine.2 Plaintiff sued for trespass and, follow-
ing a jury trial, was awarded compensatory and punitive damages."'
The trial court set aside both awards, however, and ordered a new
trial on the issue of damages.27
On appeal, the appellate division modified the judgment of the
trial court, reinstating the compensatory damage award and re-
manding for a new trial on the punitive damage issue. 5 Justice
Lupiano, writing for the majority, 23 rejected the argument ad-
vanced by CBS that notwithstanding its trespass,'" the first amend-
ment protected its news gathering from any damage award.2 14 Rea-
soning that the exercise of the right of freedom of the press is tem-
pered by the duty not to infringe upon the rights and liberties of
others,22 the court concluded that CBS could properly be held ac-
countable for compensatory damages resulting from its wrongful
conduct.2 3 With respect to punitive damages, the court noted that
the purpose of such awards is to punish the defendant, deter him
from repeating his wrongful conduct and protect society from simi-
lar acts. 244 Stating that conduct evincing a wrongful motive or a
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights would justify a punitive
damage award,2'5 the court remanded the issue for a new trial.21
2 Id. at 493 n.1, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 816 n.1.
2 Plaintiff was awarded $1,200 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive
damages. Id. at 495, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
Id. at 493, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 816. The trial court set aside the damage awards because
it had excluded testimony relevant to the defendant's motive and purpose in entering the
restaurant. Id. at 495, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
us Id.
2' The majority consisted of Justices Lupiano, Lane, Markewich and Sandler. Presiding
Justice Murphy dissented in part.
"I The trial court observed that the CBS reporter tried to justify the intrusion by calling
the restaurant a "place of public accomodation." The reporter admitted, however, that the
crew did not enter the restaurant for the purpose of dining. 61 App. Div. 2d at 493 n.1, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 816 n.1.
2" Id. at 493-94, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
22 Id. at 494, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817. Justice Lupiano observed that "the First Amendment
is not a shibboleth before which all other rights must succumb." Id.
243 Id.
21 Id. at 494-95, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817. The notion of awarding damages as a punishment
for civil wrongs is not without criticism. See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 408, 179
N.E.2d 497, 500, 501, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492, 494 (1961) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting); C.
MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 276 (1935); Note, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv.
1173, 1176-83 (1931). Several reasons are advanced for this view, including the possibility of
subjecting a defendant to double punishment in the form of criminal and civil penalties, the
fact that it is in the jury's discretion whether to give an award, and the imprecise standards
which sometimes result in excessive judgments. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 408,
179 N.E.2d 497, 500, 501, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492, 494 (1961) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting)
(citing C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGEs 276 (1935)).
"1 61 App. Div. 2d at 495, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
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While accountability in damages may deter, to some extent,
aggressive pursuit of newsworthy stories,"' courts have refused to
accord the press special privileges to shield them from liability for
tortious conduct committed in the course of news gathering.24 8
Thus, there appears to be nothing unusual in holding CBS liable
in compensatory damages for trespass. Furthermore, while the
appellate division's holding that the press can be liable for punitive
damages is novel, 5 it appears to be conceptually sound. 0
In its haste to serve notice that punitive damages are assessable
for trespasses committed by news gatherers, however, the court
seems to have expanded the availability of such damages in all
trespass actions. While New York has long recognized that punitive
damages may be recovered in trespass actions,"'1 those incidents of
Id. at 495, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 818. Justice Murphy dissented, reasoning that the defen-
dant's "overly aggressive but good faith" pursuit of news did not warrant a punitive damages
award. Id. at 496, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 818 (Murphy, P.J., dissenting in part).
"' In the context of a defamation action, Justice Black noted that "[t]he half-million-
dollar verdict does give dramatic proof, however, that state libel laws threaten the very
existence of an American press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and
bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring). The fear of damage awards in
the news-gathering context may similarly inhibit the press in their pursuit of newsworthy
stories. See 61 App. Div. 2d 491, 496, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (1st Dep't 1978) (Murphy, P.J.,
dissenting in part). See also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998 (2d Cir. 1973), wherein
injunctive relief was tailored narrowly so as not to unnecessarily inhibit the photographer's
"reasonable effors [sic] to 'cover' defendant." Id.
I" See note 229 supra. Although recognizing the extensive privileges accorded the press
under the first amendment, the Supreme Court has stated: "It is clear that the First Amend-
ment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the
enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 682 (1972). In a recent decision, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the
Supreme Court has upheld the right of the owner of a private, open-to-the-public shopping
center to exclude speakers and pamphleteers from his property. Viewing the shopping center
as private property open to the public for a particular purpose, and recognizing that the first
amendment only guards against governmental invasions of free speech rights, the Court
upheld the right of the owner to remove trespassers from his property. Id. at 512-21; accord,
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Similarly, in Le Mistral, the plaintiff's property
was open to the general public for purposes of dining. Based on Hudgens and Lloyd, CBS'
trespass into the restaurant for purposes of collecting news arguably was not protected by the
first amendment.
"I Presiding Justice Murphy noted that "[t]o the date of this opinion, it may be safely
said that the news media has rarely been taken to task for the type of unwarranted intrusion
presented in this proceeding." 61 App. Div. 2d at 496, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 818 (Murphy, P.J.,
dissenting in part). But see Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975), discussed in
note 229 supra, wherein punitive damages were awarded against a reporter for defamatory
statements made in the course of gathering news.
21 See note 229 supra; note 251 & accompanying text infra.
"11 E.g., Sheldon v. Baumann, 19 App. Div. 61, 45 N.Y.S. 1016 (1st Dep't 1897); Steen-
burgh v. McRorie, 60 Misc. 510, 113 N.Y.S. 1118 (Otsego County Ct. 1908). To recover
punitive damages for trespass, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant
[Vol. 52:594
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trespass that have resulted in punitive damage awards have gener-
ally been accompanied by threats, violence or repeated intrusions
on the plaintiff's property.2 2 Although this type of conduct was
absent in Le Mistral, the appellate division held that punitive dam-
ages could properly be awarded. While it is uncertain whether the
courts will be as willing to approve punitive damage awards in tres-
pass actions generally, it is clear that where attempts by the news
media to obtain information infringe on the rights of others, liability
and large punitive damage awards may result.
Ronald S. Meckler
Prima facie tort action upheld despite absence of special damages
and specific intent to harm
Under the prima facie tort doctrine, a wrong which does not fall
within a traditional tort category may nevertheless be actionable if
the wrongdoer, without just cause or excuse,23 has wilfully and in-
tentionally caused injury.24 As the doctrine has evolved in New
acted with "actual malice," or that the defendant's conduct evinced a "wanton and willful
or reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights." MacKennan v. Jay Bern Realty Co., 30 App. Div.
2d 679, 679, 291 N.Y.S.2d 953, 954 (2d Dep't 1968); see Fury Imports, Inc. v. Shakespeare
Co., 554 F.2d 1376, 1388.89 (5th Cir. 1977); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d
497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
Although not explicitly required by the standard, a showing of violent acts or repeated
intrusions has been necessary for the plaintiff to satisfy his burden of proof. See note 252 &
accompanying text infra.
5 See Wort v. Jenkins, 14 Johns. 352 (1817) (per curiam); Smalling v. Jackson, 133 App.
Div. 382, 117 N.Y.S. 268 (2d Dep't 1909); Sheldon v. Baumann, 19 App. Div. 61, 45 N.Y.S.
1016 (1st Dep't 1897); DaCosta v. Technico Constr. Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 583, 344 N.Y.S.2d 967
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1973), aff'd per curiam, 78 Misc. 2d 1100, 360 N.Y.S.2d 846
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1974); Norton v. Glicksman, 9 Misc. 2d 985, 174 N.Y.S.2d 12
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1957); Tifft v. Culver, 3 Hill 180 (Sup. Ct. Utica County 1842);
Steenburgh v. McRorie, 60 Misc. 510, 113 N.Y.S. 1118 (Otsego County Ct. 1908).
211 Any excuse or justification, including profit motive or business justification, is suffi-
cient in New York to negate evidence of actual malice. See, e.g., Squire Records, Inc. v.
Vanguard Recording Soc. Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 190, 268 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1st Dep't 1966) (per
curiam), aff'd mem., 19 N.Y.2d 797, 226 N.E.2d 542, 279 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1967); note 255 infra.
Hecht v. Air Reduction Co., 41 Misc. 2d 463, 245 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1963).
24 Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 172,
148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't 1956); Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338. 342, 127
N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (1st Dep't 1954), affl'd, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828
(1958). Traditional tort law has been criticized by one noted commentator as "a set of pigeon-
holes, each bearing a name, into which the act or omission of the defendant must be fitted
before the law will take cognizance of it and afford a remedy." W. PRossER, LAw oF ToRTs §
1 (4th ed. 1971). In response to this inherent rigidity, the courts developed the prima facie
tort doctrine as a means of providing redress in instances where harm is intentionally and
